Total globalization has taken the world order into turmoil.
The difference of interests, circumstances and opportunities, as well as the socioeconomic regimes of the participants at first implied risks of imbalances.
Consequently, the wrong policy of coordination— excessive integration with reference autocracies or forced actual physical (military) coercion to change regimes— led the situation to financial and ideological contradictions. The planet has once again clustered in to democratic and authoritarian and is obviously already in a stage of conflict between the two poles, deglobalization trends along with a tightening of economic plus social conditions.
Integration problems and deglobalization processes have also begun within developed countries, such as the complications of the European Union’s financial homogeneity and Brexit. However , these are the problems of homogeneous liberal democracies. Accordingly, whichever contradictions they possess, the particular processes of finding equilibrium take a civilized track. Moreover, as the focus shifts from internal contradictions to exterior contradictions, to threats from your authoritarian world, internal unbalances weaken and, on the contrary, incorporation processes begin to strengthen once again. A vivid example of this is the creation of various alliances in various areas, such as the Anglo-Saxon alliance, the alliance of a specific US information-exchange regime with Pacific countries, a potential association of oil consumers, plus, finally, the cohesion of democracies with regard to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Until now, Western democracies have got followed mainly two politics directions with respect to autocracies: external military intervention or deeply socioeconomic integration with a sobre facto agreement to maintain severe regimes according to the principle “ your internal affairs are usually your affairs. ” Both, as we can now see, possess negative consequences.
On the one hand, attempts at institutional liberalization and democratization of autocracies and dictatorships through military intervention and compelled external forms of reform of the socioeconomic frame are obviously an inefficient way to civilize autocratic regimes for a number of reasons. Mé tis in autocracies— that is, ethical and social values, customs, traditions, plus established social rhetoric— contradict or are in some way inconsistent with the liberal market ideals of the Western world.
Elites have no positive bonuses to change preferences, and the people has no positive incentives in order to protest. Thus, military invasion and the use of force worsen the social crisis, are not able to create the conditions plus incentives for liberalization, and delay the transformation of the mestizo for the entrenchment of market institutions and democracy.
On the other hand, the particular deep integration of autocracies into global value-added procedures, primarily to reduce production and resource costs, has resulted in a significant strengthening and reinforcement of authoritarian regimes. Within autocracies, elites are rent-seeking entrepreneurs unfettered by modern society. Their success plus well-being depend on budget revenues, and under conditions of expanding global integration, such regimes ensure for themselves an increase in budget profits and maximize their durability. There is no question of entry to the budget: in authoritarian regimes, this is an absolute monopoly from the regime elite, and competition can only come from the inside.
When budget revenues are large, they are enough to ensure the stability of the status quo of the ruling elite. Contrary to the background of the concept of “ noninterference” in the internal affairs of such authoritarian nations, the stability of their regimes, ensured by the abovementioned elements, entails the expansion associated with opportunities for the ruling elites in propaganda, obtaining public support, repression of dissenters, and— most importantly— in potential external hostility.
An alternative way to the first two described over is a policy of disintegration, a policy of limiting the involvement of authoritarian routines in global economic and social processes on the same terms. This is a necessary measure in order to both reduce the production plus resource dependence of the developed world on resource dictatorships and create incentives to change or even transform regimes in the future and also to incline to the necessary assistance in the present. Such constraints would certainly reduce the opportunities for rent-seeking enrichment by autocratic elites, increase social discontent through falling incomes and living standards, and reduce opportunities with regard to external aggression.
Reducing the production outsourcing and logistics potential of autocratic economies, as well as their source exports, will reduce the reliance of the civilized world on resource and production-component imports and will strengthen production plus resource security.
Disintegration with autocracies may give impetus to progradation in various aspects: both in choice energy and technology, considering that higher costs and cheaper margins in the new firm environment will be an incentive in order to innovative development and search for ways to improve efficiency.
The resource and production leverage provided by autocratic regimes is actually some kind of “ resource curse” of Traditional western economies, when the motivation to increase efficiency and innovation drops against the background of voluminous and cheap resources. Such leverage has contributed to the decline of entrepreneurial effort and individual responsibility in the Western world, expanding state expansion and social subsidies. As a result, agents’ dependence on the state increased, and redistribution of benefits became more vertical.
This is why, paradoxically, the tightening up of economic conditions within advanced economies can activate the state to reduce social well being and expenditures, and financial agents to increase entrepreneurial initiative and individual responsibility. Basically, it would stimulate a shift away from the “ leftist” discourse of social plus economic policy toward the important ethical and social beliefs of market capitalism, individualism and meritocracy.
In fact , such a disintegrative plan could take several instructions.
The first direction is the creation of alleged friendly chains— i. e., the building of resource plus production close ties within friendly countries. This implies removing much of the production capacity away from autocratic countries and the moving of resource sources.
The second path is the creation of a maximum number of restrictions that cut-off authoritarian regimes from worldwide economic processes and create unfavorable conditions for their domestic financial systems. This is realized through sanctions restrictions, both direct and indirect, aimed at creating a good intolerable environment for creative economic activity.
The third direction is good incentives aimed at the elites as the force that actually can make decisions, and at the population, which may be a catalyst for this kind of decisions. Here it is important to realize that it is possible to condition the progressive decisions of both the elites (be it a voluntary change of political course by the current government or perhaps a change through a forced rotation within the elites, usually referred to as a palace coup) and the population, to give impetus for their passion in the right direction only when both of them because agents understand and correctly assess the benefits and costs. And for this, firstly, it is vital to clearly mark in the benefits, costs and tasks, and secondly, to create the particular conditions that condition the particular change of preferences plus maximize the efforts from the elites and the population within regime change.
In fact , all this is already appropriate and is being implemented, sadly, with a great delay and completely different extreme conditions. The aggressive geopolitical actions of a single autocracy in far eastern Europe have forced Western countries to adopt this politics paradigm, putting an end to some conciliatory policy that has survived since at least 2007.
The externalities for the developed world will certainly be significant. Moreover, they are currently significant today. They take two main forms: social and economic. Economic effects are usually inflation as a result of resource— plus production— deficits arising from recanalizations.
The interpersonal negative effects are a continuation of the economic ones: an increase in social tensions amid dropping incomes and rising costs caused by inflationary spiking. In authoritarian countries, the unavoidable growth of social stress will lead, among other things, in order to increased immigration to developed countries.
Nevertheless , both of these externalities can be neutralized in the foreseeable future, as I will discuss in my next article. The things i can say here is that will models and research with this topic clearly point to acceptable ways of dealing with these problems.
Another important possible cost is geopolitical. It is the intensification of the processes of unification of autocracies. However , autocracies are different, and it is necessary to make conditions in which autocracies are more comfortable cooperating with the developed world and changing their preferences than joining the particular camp of authoritarian routines. In fact , this is exactly what has been done with respect to Russia now, including all sorts of sanctions and impending restrictions on imports of hydrocarbons. Creating circumstances of contradiction between the interests of the various autocracies and stimulating their transformation is a necessary part of the policy of disintegration.
Limiting integration and encouraging routine change is a long-term procedure. However , one must realize that the world order has indeed changed. It is neither possible nor dangerous to be in a situation of illusory optimism and to believe that maximum rapprochement with countries where authoritarian routines are entrenched, social openness, geopolitical inclusiveness and effective globalization are the real way to a bright future. It really is precisely this kind of conciliatory plan or, on the contrary, the policy of forced external military intervention that has brought the planet into a state of disturbance.
The path to cooperation under conditions associated with acute conflict and insufficient empathy lies in two instructions: coercion of the opposite part through negative and good incentives and the positioning, or maximization, of the expenses of both sides.
The first is the way the developed world should go, the second reason is the way of direct confrontation, which should be avoided. The West with great hold off is following the first route. We can only hope that there is an understanding that the second route is a disaster.